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Abstract 
 
Reference emission scenarios in the literature have been the target of criticisms that suggest 
they convey too optimistic views on spontaneous energy-GDP decoupling of emerging 
countries economies. This article focuses on the case of India. It explores the role of current 
suboptimalities of the Indian power sector (structural under-investment in the sector leading 
to capacity shortage, power cuts and low efficiency) on future energy-GDP decoupling. To do 
so, it uses a hybrid general equilibrium framework, in which these suboptimalities are 
explicitly introduced. The results highlight that whether the constraints on investments in the 
power sector persist or not leads to contrasted trends in energy-GDP decoupling and GHG 
emissions. Over the short-term, capital scarcity in the power sector constrains the 
development of energy-intensive activities and therefore leads to higher energy-GDP 
decoupling. But on the longer-term, constrains on the power sector capacity limits substitution 
from fossil fuels to electricity, which entails both a low energy-GDP decoupling and a 
constraint on GDP growth when oil prices are high. The alleviation of suboptimalities appears 
thus as an insurance policy towards future oil price increase. 
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Introduction 
 
Reference scenarios play a critical role in the message conveyed to policy makers for the 
definition of GHG emission mitigation actions.  
 
Recently, existing reference scenarios, either from the SRES (IPCC, 2000) or from other 
studies using global energy models, have been the target of repeated criticisms. 
 
First, the relevance of reference scenarios is questioned by actual observations, as Raupach et 
al. (2008) and Sheehan (2008) showed that GHG emissions are increasing faster than 
predicted in the large panel of SRES modeling exercises (IPCC, 2000). One of the major 
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reasons for the discrepancy between short term GHG emissions projection from models and 
recent trends is the persistent very high levels of economic growth in emerging countries. 
Until recently economic growth rates considered for these countries in models were 
significantly lower than currently observed growth rates. This pushed modellers to recalibrate 
their modelling exercises on recent trends: Blandford et al. (2008) revised emission growth 
projections from MERGE for China with recent trends, the World Energy Outlook 2007 (IEA, 
2007) and the International Energy Outlook 2008 (EIA, 2008) adopted much higher economic 
growth rates for China and India compared to preceding publications1. 
 
A second side of criticisms (Urban et al. 2007, Van Ruijven et al. 2008) discusses the 
suitability of methodologies used in existing global energy models to represent the 
specificities of the developing countries’ energy systems. In particular, it appears that most 
models neglect some characteristics such as supply shortages, poor performance of the power 
sector, economic structural change, urban-rural divide, traditional bio-fuels etc, which may 
bias results. 
 
A third trend of criticism, initiated by an article from Pielke et al. (2008), questions the 
optimistic views on the automatic (without policies) decarbonisation of economies that are 
reflected by existing reference scenarios, in particular SRES scenarios. Moreover they warn 
these scenarios may under-estimate the challenge for climate change mitigation and convey 
biased views to policy makers 
 
Acknowledging these criticisms, this article proposes to build reference scenarios for India 
taking explicitly into account specificities of energy systems and particularly current 
suboptimalities of the power sector: structural under-investment leading to capacity shortage, 
power cuts and low efficiency. Our objective is to disentangle the mechanisms driving 
decarbonisation of the economy and the constraints that may stall this process. To do so we 
use IMACLIM-R a dynamic recursive energy-economy model that represents a second best 
world with market imperfections and short-run adjustments constraints along a long-term 
growth path. The first section is an overview of the energy context in India focusing on 
existing suboptimalities in the power sector, and of existing energy forecasts for India. The 
second section describes this modelling framework and details how the Indian power sector 
sub-optimalities are represented. The third section presents three alternative scenarios, based 
on contrasted assumptions on the evolution of these suboptimalities. Results show that future 
energy decoupling would increase in the future only if suboptimalities are alleviated. On the 
contrary persisting suboptimalities in the power sector would lock the Indian economy in a 
carbon and energy intensive technological pathway. 
 
 
1 What energy decoupling in the future in India? 
 
Energy intensity and carbon intensity of GDP in developing countries are determining 
indicators regarding climate change. In particular, climate mitigation targets developing 
                                                 
1 These revisions upwards of future growth rates for emerging countries date from before the financial crisis. More 
recent studies either keep assuming high growth rates for emerging countries in the coming years (see for instance 
IEO 2009 in Table 1), or take into account a relative slowdown of economic growth (see for instance WEO 2009 in 
Table 1). 
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countries adopt are often expressed in energy intensity or carbon intensity2 evolution because 
climate mitigation should not be a supplementary constraint on their development.  
 
In this first part, we analyze what could be the evolution of energy intensity in India. 
 
1.1  Indian energy intensity drivers 
 
Figure 1 pictures Indian GDP energy intensity since 1975. After important increase until early 
90s, energy intensity has decreased during the 20 following years.  
 
During the phase of Indian take off, between the 70s and the 90s, important structural changes 
have driven economic growth and commercial primary energy consumption in India: 
 A fast industrialization for infrastructure building, relying on highly energy 
intensive industries, based on highly energy consuming technologies compared to 
international standards in industry and in the power sector (Dasgupta, 1999, 
Mongia et al., 2001). 
 The development of modern energy forms, allowing the substitution from 
traditional energy carriers towards electricity.  
 The evolution of consumption styles with a smooth diffusion of end-use 
equipments and motor vehicles. 
 
Commercial primary energy consumption grew faster than economic growth (5.7% vs. 4.3%). 
This led to an important increase in energy intensity. 
 
After this first period, energy intensity began to decrease due to the combined effect of: 
 A structural evolution of the economy: in 2008 the tertiary sector represents 54% of 
GDP; 
 Energy efficiency improvement in industry: energy intensities of industries such as 
iron and steel, fertilizer and cement have declined significantly: by 70% for iron and 
steel, and by 65% for cement industries, between 1990 and 2005 (Kumar and Kumar, 
2008). 
 
 
                                                 
2 Following the Copenhagen Accord, India pledged to reduce the emission intensity of its GDP by 20-25% in 2020 
compared to 2005 level, and China to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45% in 2020 
compared to 2005 level. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of key energy indicators, period 1975-2008. Source: Enerdata. 
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This trend could continue in the future, as emerging countries could benefit from: 
 The “leapfrogging mechanism” (Goldemberg, 1998) that argues developing countries 
should leapfrog to low energy GDP elasticity as they would benefit from transfers of 
modern and low GHG emitting technologies.  
 
 The material content of consumption styles: whether emerging countries choose to 
reproduce industrialized countries consumption standards with high levels of 
saturations for equipments  or dematerialized modes of consumptions will induce 
different structures of economies and contrasted energy needs. 
 
Nevertheless, other drivers could deter future energy decoupling. 
 
First, Indian energy intensive sectors still remain highly inefficient with energy consumption 
critically high compared to international standards (Graus et al. 2007; Kim and Worrell, 
2002), and one main objective of the government is to increase the (currently low) share of 
industry. This would tend to increase energy use per unit of GDP. 
 
Second, energy services for both households and productive sectors are still significantly 
restrained: 
 Per capita commercial energy consumption is only 0.3 tep in India in 2007 compared 
to the world average of 1.7 tep, 1.4 tep for China and 7.7 tep for USA. 
 Electrification covers only 60% of Indian households. The energy needs of Indian 
households not connected to the grid rely mainly on biomass or on diesel generators to 
compensate for the deficiencies in the centralized power supply. Capacity shortage 
amounts to 10 GW (14.8% of peak power) and the gap between supply and demand 
rose to 66 TWh (9.6% of demand) in 2007 (Planning Commission), even though the 
installed power capacity has increased from 66 GW in 1990 to 146 GW in 2007. 
Capacity shortage leads to power cuts, affecting both households and productive 
sectors, thus leading to lower productivity and to the use of diesel generators. 
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One main challenge for the Government is thus to provide electricity and modern forms of 
energy to all. This would again mean an increase in final energy consumption and a 
proportional increase in primary energy consumption considering Indian power plant and grid 
performances are currently very low. A significant improve in energy efficiency of the power 
system only could moderate this increase. This will depend upon the investment capacity to 
respond jointly: 
 
 to the enlargement of energy access by financing new plants and transmission and 
distribution (T&D) infrastructures,  
 to energy efficiency increase by improving the efficiency of existing and future plants 
and of currently deficient T&D of electricity. 
 
It is thus very difficult to assert whether the recent decrease in energy intensity will continue 
or not. In the following, several Indian energy prospective exercises are presented focusing on 
the way energy decoupling drivers are taken into account and on the resulting energy 
decoupling. 
 
 
1.2 Analysis of existing reference scenarios 
 
Scenarios considered in this subsection are summarized in Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable.. Methodologies and assumptions are described below: 
 
 Projections from the World Energy Outlook (WEO) realized by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009) and from the International Energy 
Outlook (IEO) realized by the US Department of Energy (EIA, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009) are based on bottom-up models: exogenous economic growth rates and 
assumptions related to structural changes in the economy and to the diffusion of 
energy efficient technologies and equipments determine the energy mix in (2015 and) 
2030. Resulting decoupling of GDP is shown in Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable.. 
 The Integrated Energy Policy (IEP) Report (Parikh, 2006) was commissioned by the 
government to undertake a comprehensive review of aspects like energy security, 
research, environmental concerns, and energy conservation in order to make policy 
recommendation. Economic growth rates are taken as political objectives and energy 
decoupling exogenous assumptions set future energy requirements. Two sets of 
assumptions related to economic growth (8% and 9%) and to primary energy 
decoupling (constant elasticity and falling elasticity) are used; they determine the level 
of commercial primary energy demand. 
 
Table 1: Energy decoupling comparison between past tendencies, WEO and IEO energy prospective scenarios and 
IEP Report. Assumptions are in italics and results are in bold characters. 
 
  
Period  Elasticity of primary energy consumption to GDP 
Past tendencies  1975‐95  1.25 
1995‐05  0.75 
WEO   Until 2015  0.44 – 0.51 
2015‐30  0.57 – 0.6 
IEO  Until 2015  0.36 – 0.7 
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2015‐30  0.49 – 0.52 
IEP ‐ Falling 
elasticities 
2005‐11  0.75 
2011‐21  0.70 
2021‐31  0.67 
IEP ‐ Constant 
elasticities  2005‐31  0.8 
 
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.compares energy intensity of WEOs and IEOs 
results  to assumptions adopted in IEP:  
 Primary energy decoupling decreases from 0.75 in 2005 till around 0.5 in 2015 in 
WEO and even less in IEOs and increases again after 2015. In 2030, energy intensity 
is halved compared to current levels.  
 In IEP, two exogenous assumptions are considered. In the first one, energy decoupling 
decreases during the whole period, from 0.75 in 2005 to 0.70 in 2015 and to 0.67 in 
2030. In the second assumption, energy intensity remains constant. The reason for 
having kept these two sets of assumptions is that normally overall elasticity falls over 
time as is corroborated by the time series data for India’s commercial energy 
consumption. However IEP states that for India the energy elasticity of GDP growth 
may not fall any further as rising income levels will foster more energy intensive 
lifestyle.  
  
In spite of these contrasted pictures in term of energy decoupling, primary energy demand 
drivers are quite the same in WEO and IEP3: 
 Slight increase in industry’s share of total final energy demand. This trend is 
consistent with the political objective of reinforcement of Indian industry activities, 
but there is a shift away from energy-intensive heavy manufacturing towards lighter 
industries and services. In WEO 20074, industry’s share of energy demand edges up to 
34% in 2030 compared to 28% in 2005; 
 Evolution of lifestyles. With the very high economic growth considered in all 
scenarios, and particularly until 2015, household energy service (household 
equipment, electric appliances, mobility) demand increase is very high. In WEO 2007, 
the total vehicle stock in India is projected to increase from 68 million in 2004 to 295 
million5 by 2030, overtaking that of the United States soon after 2025; refrigerator 
sales are expected to nearly triple by 2020;  
 Enlargement of electricity access: In 2005, the share of lighting met by electricity in 
urban households was about 90%, but only 50% in rural households. High electricity 
generation and consumption growth rates are consistent with the governmental priority 
for giving modern energy and electricity access to 100% of the Indian population. By 
2030, in WEO 2007, all lighting is projected to be met by electricity in urban areas 
while in rural areas about 7% of households will still rely on kerosene for lighting. 
Electricity growth is even more important in IEP. 
 Important energy efficiency improvement.  Indian power plants are among the least 
efficient in the world. In WEO 2007, efficiency is expected to increase from 27% now 
                                                 
3 In IEO, energy demand growth drivers for India are not detailed. 
4 In this subsection, we often refer to WEO 2007, as this edition was dedicated to India and China. 
5 This number however corresponds to a relatively low equipment rate: around 200 vehicles for 1000 persons. It is 
around 800 vehicles for 1000 persons today in USA. 
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to 38% in 20306. In all WEO scenarios electricity T&D losses decrease significantly. 
In IEP also, the gross efficiency in power generation increases from the current 
average 30.5% to 34%: efficiency of new plants improves from the prevailing 36% to 
at least 38-40%. 
 
The combined effect of these drivers leads, in all WEO and IEO scenarios, to a very 
significant GDP energy intensity decrease, while IEP scenarios are more conservative 
concerning the potential decrease in energy intensity. Actually, IEP report states that an 
aggressive pursuit of energy efficiency and conservation only7 could reduce India’s energy 
intensity by up to 25% from current levels. Financing at the same time energy efficiency 
improvements of a very inefficient system and energy access enlargement in a more energy 
intensive economy (with the deployment of industry) and with higher energy consuming 
lifestyles appears the condition to reach important energy decoupling in the future. 
 
Attracting investment in a timely manner will thus be essential and underlying assumption of 
the WEO 2007 scenario is that investment will be available and that this power infrastructure 
will be built in time, even if many challenges remain. Chronic underinvestment in power 
sector has been a major constraint to the country's development. The capacity addition targets 
set in the five-year plans have generally not been met and performance has deteriorated over 
the past three plans. Performance in the 10th plan period (2002-2007) was the worst ever. 
Less than half of the capacity envisaged was built. Insufficient investment resulted in 
electricity generation increasing at a rate well below the economic growth rate for five 
consecutive years (2001 to 2006), a situation never seen in the past. The pace of capacity 
additions stagnated in the 1990s. Economic reforms were introduced in 1991, in the 
expectation that part of the required investment would come from the private sector. But 
many of the projects proposed have not proceeded, mainly because of an inadequate legal and 
commercial framework, involving lack of law and contract enforcement and delays in 
obtaining regulatory approvals. The target in the  2007-2012 Plan  foresees capacity additions 
of 69 GW, much higher than the unmet target of 41 GW set in the 10th Plan. 
 
This under-investment is largely due to the high risks and low profitability of investments in 
the power sector. Administered prices do not cover production costs: in 2006, the average 
price of electricity sold covered only 77% of the average production cost. Official data 
estimate the total under-recovery of costs to 0.8% of GDP. The same report estimates that the 
residential tariff covers 56% of the generation costs and farmers tariff only 12%, while 
industries and the commercial sector partly compensate by paying respectively 108% and 
122% of production costs. Official data reports that subsidies to household and agriculture 
electricity consumption tripled to represent respectively 0.4% and 1.1% of GDP. In 2000, 
agriculture electricity uses represented 1/3 of electricity sales in volume while the 
corresponding revenues constituted less than 5% of total revenues. 
 
These subsidies are justified by positive externalities on development, particularly regarding 
access to cheap energy for irrigation to promote food production. Nonetheless, they have 
significant side effects. First, the very low tariffs for farmers induce overconsumption, which 
increases the magnitude of capacity shortage. Overconsumption of electricity in the 
agricultural sector amounts to 30% of its consumption due to the combination of critically low 
                                                 
6 Over the projection period, the efficiency of coal fired power generation is projected to improve considerably, as 
the new plants will be larger and more efficient, and more supercritical units will be built. 
7 These measures are not considered in the IEP reference scenario. 
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prices and of frequent but unpredictable power cuts that create a strong incentive to a 
continuous use of electric pumps for irrigation (Dorin and Jullien, 2004). Second, low 
revenues from electricity sales induce maintenance under-financing and increasing 
inefficiencies in T&D. Technical and commercial T&D losses have increased from around 
20% in 1993 to more than 30% in 2001 (Thakur et al., 2006)8. Moreover, power sector 
inefficiencies constrain economic activity and economic growth: electricity shortages hamper 
productivity and competitiveness.  
 
It appears that the sub-optimalities of the Indian power sector described above9 are structural 
characteristics of the Indian energy system. Therefore, they have to be taken into account in 
modelling framework to develop realistic prospective scenarios, as advocated fifteen years 
ago by Shukla (1995) and more recently by Urban et al. (2007) and Van Ruijven et al. (2008). 
Next section describes a modelling framework able to embark sub-optimalities of the Indian 
power sector and to represent power and investment shortage and their impact on economic 
growth. 
 
2 A modelling framework to represent a second best world 
 
2.1  Model architecture and major features 
 
The IMACLIM-R model 10 (Sassi and al. 2010) is a recursive, dynamic, multi-region and multi-
sector Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy. It describes 
growth patterns in second best worlds through a hybrid and recursive dynamic architecture 
that captures market imperfections, partial uses of production factors and imperfect 
expectations.  
 
2.1.1. A growth engine with gaps between natural and effective growth 
IMACLIM-R relies on exogenous assumptions11 of regional labour productivity and active 
population growths, the sum of which determines the ‘natural’ growth rates (Solow, 1956). 
They represent real GDP growth that would be realized at constant unemployment and 
structure of the economy. For India, natural growth decreases from 7.2% to 3.9% in 2050 
(Figure 2). 
                                                 
8 The level of T&D losses is in fact uncertain. For instance, the value stated by the Indian Planning Commission was 
22% in 1998 while the World Bank (1998) pointed out that it could actually be twice this official level. Moreover, as 
there is no metering of the electricity consumption it is difficult to distinguish technical from commercial losses. 
9 For further description of suboptimalities and of the institutional aspects of the Indian power sector, refer to 
Mathy and Guivarch (2010). 
 
10 Details concerning calibration and disaggregation are given in SOM. 
11 See SOM for details on these assumptions. 
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Figure 2 : Exogenous potential growth of the Indian GDP over the 2050 time horizon, and its decomposition. 
 
The endogenous ‘effective’ growth rates can be different, higher or lower, from ‘natural’ 
rates, depending on the evolutions of unemployment and labour allocation across regions and 
sectors. These evolutions are constrained by financial resources for investments and short-
term rigidities like capital stock inertia, frictions in reallocating labour or wage rigidity.12  
 
 
2.1.2. A recursive and modular architecture to account for inertia in technical 
systems and sub-optimalities 
 
The IMACLIM-R model has a hybrid structure relying on a consistent representation of the 
economy in money values and physical quantities. Its recursive structure organizes a 
systematic exchange of information between a top-down annual static equilibrium providing a 
snapshot of the economy at each yearly time step, and bottom-up dynamic modules informing 
on the evolution of technical parameters between two equilibria.  
 
Within the static equilibrium, domestic and international markets for all goods – except 
factors such as capital and labour – are fully cleared by a unique set of relative prices that 
depend on the behaviours of representative agents on the demand and supply sides. It 
determines the following variables: relative prices, wages, labour, quantities of goods and 
services, value flows. Within the static equilibrium, producers are assumed to operate under 
short-run constraints of (i) a fixed maximal production capacity defining the maximum level 
of physical output achievable, and (ii) fixed input-output coefficients representing current set 
of embodied techniques. The only margin of freedom of producers is to adjust the production 
capacities utilisation rate according to the relative market prices of inputs and output, taking 
into account increasing costs when the production capacities utilization rate approaches one13. 
This represents a different paradigm from usual production specifications, since the ‘capital’ 
factor is not always fully utilized. 
 
                                                 
12 Guivarch et al. (2011) analyze the impact of the real wages rigidities on the model results. 
13 Following (Corrado and Mattey, 1997), we assume that this is generally caused by higher labour costs due to extra 
hours with lower productivity, costly night work and more maintenance works. 
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The dynamic modules make the short-term constraints of the static equilibriums evolve in 
time. They represent the accumulation of capital and its technical content. They include the 
modelling of (i) the evolution of capital and energy equipment stock described in both vintage 
and physical units, (ii) of technological choices of economic agent described as discrete 
choices in explicit technology portfolios for key sectors such as electricity, transportation and 
alternative liquid fuels, or captured through reduced form of technology rich bottom-up 
models, and (iii) of endogenous technical change for energy technologies.14  
 
Aggregate capital accumulation is controlled by exogenous saving rates, but IMACLIM-R 
represents second-best investment decisions under imperfect foresight. Thus, installed capital 
resulting from past investment decisions may not be adapted to future economic settings. 
However, it cannot be renewed overnight due to inertias and acts as a constraint on growth 
pathways, like in the case of a sharp increase of fossil energy prices.  
 
 
2.2  Representing market and institutional failures of the power sector in Imaclim-R 
modelling architecture 
 
In the static equilibriums, the electricity price depends on the characteristics of the installed 
power generation capacities (the type of fuel used and the efficiency, including T&D losses) 
and on the utilization rate of these generation capacities: high utilization rates induce extra-
costs. Between each static equilibria, the evolution of power generation capacities depends on 
annual investment decisions, that determine new capacities installation (among 26 generation 
technologies in competition) to satisfy (imperfectly) anticipated future demand minimizing 
generation costs, given (imperfect) anticipations of future fuel prices. This minimization is 
run under the constraint of the actual amount of investment allocated to the electric sector 
 
Within this modelling framework, suboptimalities of the Indian power sector are embarked. 
The analysis focuses on under-investment in the sector, and its consequences, namely (i) 
power generation capacity shortage, and (ii) inefficiencies and T&D losses. 
 
(i) Under-investment in the power sector is represented by a gap between the estimated need 
for investments (i.e. the investment to build the optimal mix of productive equipment to 
satisfy the anticipated electricity demand) and realized investments in the power sector. 
Realized investments for all sectors are constrained by sectors profitability and total domestic 
investment plus net capital inflows. Additionally, to represent at the aggregate level the 
capital scarcity in the Indian power sector, investments in the sector are limited to a maximum 
share of GDP.  
(ii) Power generation capacity shortage is represented by over utilization of generation 
capacities. In the model, a utilization rate superior to 0.8 means that the capacity is overused. 
In 2008, the utilization rate of electricity production capacities is 0.86, which corresponds to 
7.5% of capacity shortage (i.e. 7.5% more capacities would be needed to reach a utilization 
rate of 0.8) and is consistent with estimations given above. This over utilization of productive 
                                                 
14 See SOM for further details on the representation of the evolution of energy supply and demand, energy efficiency 
and induced technical change. 
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capacities entails extra generation costs15 and raises the electricity usage cost, which is a 
stylized representation of electricity shortage (power cuts) for the Indian economy16. 
(iii) Power plants characteristics, in particular their efficiencies, as well as T&D losses are 
calibrated on the sectoral model POLES (LEPII-EPE, 2006). In 2001, the calibration date, 
overall efficiency of power generation is equal to 32% and T&D losses are 35%. 
 
The following section uses the Imaclim-R model to project over the period 2008-2050 
baseline scenarios taking into account the evolution of the three elements described above.  
 
3 Energy decoupling and power sector suboptimalities in baseline 
scenarios 
 
3.1 Description of baseline scenario parameterization 
 
Whether constraint on investments in the power sector will be alleviated or not in coming 
decades will depend upon several factors: 
 The evolution of regulatory and administrative barriers and of commercial 
framework in the power sector and the reduction of investment risks in order 
creating effective incentives for private investors. 
 Possible increased tensions on the international capital market as in the future 
Europe and China may experience a drop of their saving capacities due to an 
aging population (Aglietta et al., 2006). 
 
These elements legitimate investigating three possible evolutions of the investment constraint 
in the power sector: the continuation of current trends (MEDIAN), the deterioration of the 
investment context (INV-) and an alleviation of investment constraint (INV+). These 
parameters are set respectively to 2.2%, 1.8% and 3% of annual GDP.  
 
This financing is invested in new power capacities. Nevertheless to bridge the gap between 
demand and supply, financing T&D loss reduction should also become a priority. Historically, 
capital scarcity in the Indian power sector has prevented from investing in maintenance of the 
T&D network. This is why we assume that in India a stringent capital constraint prevents 
from improving T&D losses. On the contrary, the alleviation of the capital constraint would 
trigger T&D loss decrease. These assumptions are implemented in INV-, MEDIAN and 
INV+. Cost and technical potential parameterization (Table 2) is consistent with Ruet (2001). 
 
Table 2: Typology of scenarios  
 INV+ MEDIAN INV- 
Investment constraint (%GDP) 3% 2.2% 1.8% 
 
T&D losses 
decrease linearly to 
10% in 2050 
decrease linearly to 
20% in 2050 
constant 
 
                                                 
15 Mean generation costs increase when capacity is overused due to the existence of static decreasing returns due to 
higher labour costs and because less efficient units are switched on last at the aggregate level. By default, following 
Corrado and Mattey (1997), in our model the increasing factor is attached to wages. 
16 There are alternative representation of shortages, in particular explicit restriction of demand growth in some 
sectors, which could have different economic effects. 
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3.2 Results 
 
Scenarios main characteristics are introduced in the following (Table 3), and economic 
mechanisms at play are then further detailed. 
 
Energy decoupling in INV-, MEDIAN and INV+ are very different from scenarios presented 
previously.  
 
Primary energy supply decoupling in Imaclim-R baseline scenarios is much lower than in 
WEO or in IEO reference scenarios, particularly during the period 2008-2015, but roughly at 
the same level as IEP assumptions.  
 
Table 3: Economic growth and energy, electricity and GHG emission indicators comparison between MEDIAN, INV+ 
and INV-  
    GDP growth rate Elasticity of primary energy consumption to GDP 
INV+ 
2008‐15  7,6%  0,73
2015‐30  5,1%  0,66
2030‐50  4,6%  0,65
2008‐50  5,3%  0,67
MEDIAN 
2008‐15  6,8%  0,68
2015‐30  5,4%  0,73
2030‐50  4,6%  0,70
2008‐50  5,3%  0,71
INV‐ 
2008‐15  5,9%  0,64
2015‐30  5,3%  0,75
2030‐50  4,6%  0,78
2008‐50  5,1%  0,74
 
The second point concerns temporal trends:  
 In all WEO and IEO scenarios energy decoupling is very high during 2008-2015 
(elasticity of primary energy consumption around 0.5) due to significant energy 
efficiency improvements compared to current trends (0.75) and followed by a relative 
decrease of the decoupling incurred by energy consuming end-use equipment 
penetration as Indian population get richer,  
 In IEP scenarios, trends show slightly decreasing, or constant, energy-GDP elasticity 
over the whole period. , 
 In Imaclim-R scenarios, energy decoupling trajectory depends upon the level of 
investment constraint in the power sector as temporal profile is different for each 
scenario:  
 in INV- energy decoupling decreases on the whole period,  
 in MEDIAN it decreases and then increases again,  
 in INV+ it increases on the whole period.  
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Figure 3 shows three distinct periods: before 2020, between 2020 and 2030 and after 2030. 
The year 2020 corresponds to the “peak oil” with a steep increase in oil prices17 until 2030 
after which prices stabilize at 200$/bl. The decade between 2020 and 2030 corresponds to the 
delay for the large scale development of substitutes to oil (Coal-To-Liquid and biofuels) with 
default parameterization of the model. During this decade of increasing oil prices, Indian GDP 
growth rates drop down in the three IMACLIM-R scenarios. 
Moreover, around 2025, CO2 emission and energy decoupling trajectories of INV-, MEDIAN 
and INV+ cross each other (Figure 4 and Figure 5): before this date, INV+ is the scenario 
with the highest CO2 emissions and with the lowest energy decoupling; after, INV- becomes 
the scenario with highest CO2 emissions and energy intensity of GDP. 
 
 
Figure 3: GDP growth rate in the Imaclim-R scenarios and potential growth 
 
Figure 4: CO2 emissions in the Imaclim-R scenarios  
 
Figure 5: Primary energy GDP intensity in the Imaclim-R scenarios  
 
                                                 
17 Oil prices in IMACLIM-R result from the endogenous interplay between the strategic behaviour of oil producers, 
constraints on supply (temporal constraints on capacity development and total reserves available) and demand 
dynamics. Assumptions concerning oil reserves amount to 2.200 Gbl of conventional oil and 1.200Gbl of non 
conventional oil (including extra-oil in Venezuela and tar sands in Canada). This is in line with estimates from the US 
Geological Survey. 
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BEFORE THE PEAK-OIL 
 
In the first period, the less capital constrained scenarios (INV+ and MEDIAN) result in 
economic growth rates close respectively to WEO2008 (7.8%) and to WEO2009 (7%) 
forecasts. On the contrary, INV- economic growth rate is significantly lower than most recent 
WEO economic assumptions during this period (5.9%).  
 
The effective investment constraint in the power sector can be evaluated, for a given value of 
T&D losses, by the gap between the estimated need for investments and realized investments. 
The stringency of the constraint will be reinforced by higher T&D losses. In a context 
characterized by power shortage, producers have no choice but using more the existing 
capacities. Productive capacity over-utilization leads to generation extra-costs as described 
previously. They raise the electricity usage cost ( 
Figure 7), which limits the development of electricity use by productive sectors as well as by 
households. 
 
In the most capital constrained scenario (INV-), the pessimistic assumptions related to the 
T&D losses explains the lower electricity consumption than in the MEDIAN scenario, the 
overall electricity generation is higher. The investment constraint stringency leads to 
important generation extra-costs ( 
Figure 7), which hinders an increase in electricity generation, in electricity consumption and 
in energy substitution towards electricity particularly in industry. The energy intensive sectors 
are more constrained than other sectors: for instance, in 2020 real GDP is reduced by 7.2% 
compared to the MEDIAN scenario, while industry output is reduced by 11.2% (Figure 8). 
This compensates the higher energy content of GDP due to high electricity T&D losses, 
which leads to almost the same energy-GDP decoupling (Figure 5). Since economic growth is 
lower, so are primary energy and total CO2 emissions (Figure 4). 
 
The release of the investment constraint in the power sector (INV+) makes possible, on the 
short term, the increase in electricity generation to meet demand. As a result, electricity 
consumption in the short term is higher: +7% in INV+ compared to the MEDIAN scenario 
(Figure 6, left panel). Even if T&D losses decrease power generation is higher than in the 
MEDIAN scenario, over the short-term (Figure 6, right panel). Extra-generation costs due to 
capacity shortage are rapidly absorbed and electricity price decreases ( 
Figure 7). This lowers industrial production costs, enhances industrial products 
competitiveness and also improves households’ purchasing power. Industrial production is 
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thus increased: for instance in 2020 real GDP is increased by 3.4% compared to the MEDIAN 
scenario, while industry output is increased by 8.5% (Figure 8). The improvement of 
households’ purchasing power also leads to more electricity consumption and more 
transportation activities. Therefore, energy-intensive activities take a larger share in GDP and 
there is less energy-GDP decoupling over the short-term (Figure 5). Since GDP is higher, 
total CO2 emissions are also higher than in MEDIAN scenario (Figure 4). 
 
These results are consistent with short term WEO results forecasting high economic growth 
rates in an unconstrained investment context. Nevertheless, forecast differences between 
WEO reference scenarios and INV+ come from different views concerning the potential pace 
of energy efficiency diffusion, the rate of T&D losses reduction and the industrial content of 
households’ consumption. It may be noted that in 2020, the three IMACLIM-R scenarios lead 
to a GHG-GDP intensity of respectively -21%, -23% and -20% of 2005 level, which is very 
close to the Indian pledge following Copenhagen Accord (-20% to -25% in 2020 compared to 
2005 level). WEO and IEO scenarios give GHG-GDP improvement significantly higher than 
the Indian pledge (between -30% and -45% in 2020 compared to 2005). 
 
 
AFTER THE PEAK OIL 
 
These trends are reversed when peak-oil occurs: in a world of high oil prices, the less the 
investment in the power sector is constraint, the higher the energy decoupling is and the lower 
GHG emissions are.  
 
After the peak oil, the electricity capacity shortage is absorbed in both MEDIAN and INV+ 
scenarios (Figure 7). The only significant difference between the two scenarios is then the 
T&D losses. Both scenarios have the same level of GDP (Figure 3), but INV+ is characterized 
by less electricity generation for the same level of consumption (Figure 6), hence more 
energy-GDP decoupling ( Figure 5) and lower emissions (Figure 4). 
 
On the contrary, in INV- scenario, power generation capacity shortage remains a lasting 
constraint. This limits the substitution between oil and electricity in the industry when oil 
prices rise. In a first time (approximately 2018-2028), the higher fossil fuel content of 
industrial inputs in the INV- scenario is compensated by the carbon content of the substituted 
electricity input in the MEDIAN scenario (Figure 9). But, when power generation efficiency 
has improved, the limit to the substitution between oil and electricity leads to higher carbon 
content of industry production in INV- scenario. Moreover, this limit to substitution entails 
higher energy costs in industrial production (Figure 10), which hinders production (Figure 8). 
The composition of higher fossil fuel unitary input (Figure 9, lower-left panel) and lower 
output leads here to higher emissions from industry (Figure 11), which adds to the higher 
emissions due to important T&D electricity losses. It leads to less energy-GDP decoupling 
than in the MEDIAN scenario (Figure 5) and higher emissions (Figure 4) even if GDP is 
lower. 
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Figure 6: Electricity generation and electricity final consumption compared to the MEDIAN scenario 
 
 
Figure 7: Electricity prices 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Industrial production in INV+ and in INV- compared to MEDIAN  
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Figure 9: Carbon content of industrial output and carbon content of electricity input in industrial production in 
MEDIAN and INV-. 
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Figure 10: Energy costs in industrial production in MEDIAN and INV- (index 1=2008) 
Energy costs in industrial production
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Figure 11: CO2 emissions from industrial production in MEDIAN and INV- (index 1=2008) (excluding emissions 
linked to electricity input to industrial production). 
 18
CO2 emissions from industry
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
20
08
20
14
20
20
20
26
20
32
20
38
20
44
20
50
MEDIAN
INV-
  
4 Conclusion 
 
Main results can be summarized as follows. First, energy decoupling in Imaclim-R scenarios 
is much lower than in WEO and IEO scenarios, but comparable to Indian expert forecasts. 
Second, the three Imaclim-R scenarios lead to contrasted evolution of energy decoupling and 
of decarbonisation, showing capital scarcity. Over the short-term, capital scarcity in the power 
sector constrains the development of energy-intensive activities and therefore leads to higher 
energy-GDP decoupling. But on the longer-term, constrains on the power sector capacity 
limits substitution from fossil fuels to electricity and entail less energy-GDP decoupling. 
Three kinds of conclusions can be drawn. 
 
First, future decarbonisation and further energy decoupling of GDP in India should not be 
considered as granted as it may appear in WEO or IEO reference scenarios or in SRES 
scenarios. Persisting capital scarcity and deficiencies in the power sector could limit energy 
efficiency improvements, and prevent power supply capacity from responding to increasing 
energy demand. This can have negative impacts on economic growth on the short term, as 
well as on a longer term when oil prices increase. 
 
Second, regarding climate policies, the realism of the reference scenario is critical for 
estimates of the costs of stabilization at a given GHG concentration and for policy 
recommendations. Persisting failures in the power sectors encloses India in a carbon and 
energy intensive technology lock-in. Climate policies such as a carbon tax in such a context 
would weigh significantly on economic growth (Mathy and Guivarch, 2010). On the contrary, 
the alleviation of investment barriers in the power sector on the short term would both lift 
barriers to development and reduce GHG emissions on the long term. This potential for 
synergies between development and climate policies could help getting out of the deadlock in 
international negotiations. 
 
Third, from a methodological point of view, it emphasizes the importance to improve the 
realism of modelling tools and to use methodologies that allow representing for each country 
specificities and sub-optimalities, and to consider the interactions and feedbacks between the 
energy system and economic mechanisms. Similar modelling methodologies, focusing on 
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China in particular, would bring valuable insights to a comprehensive understanding of 
energy and economic interactions driving current and future GHG emissions trends.  
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